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ARTICLES
Religion / State: Where the Separation Lies
Vincent J. Samar ......................................................................1
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the
Establishment Clause have failed to provide a clear framework for
determining what government actions are prohibited. Part of the
problem concerns what kinds of actions constitute an establishment
of religion. What criteria should determine the boundaries of an
establishment challenge? Are governmental actions that may only
indirectly affect religion (either positively or negatively) prohibited?
This article aims to provide a coherent and normatively justified
understanding of the Establishment Clause to help answer these
questions by considering not just the history of the Clause or the
cases the Court has decided under it, but also considering overlaps
from various philosophical justifications for the Clause—including
justifications from rights theory, political liberalism, utilitarianism,
and communitarianism. In the process, the article eliminates from
consideration the Supreme Court’s so-called “accommodationist”
approach and presents a new understanding of the neutrality test
that anchors itself between strict separation and the current neutrality approaches. This it does by also taking into account what in
moral theory is known as the doctrine of double effect and by sho wing how the doctrine further limits the various judicial views to ju st
neutrality in the new sense I suggest, while also providing both
clearer and firmer conditions for how government should operate to
insure its own neutrality.

Substantive Reasonableness Review of Federal Criminal Sentences: A
Proposed Standard
Tim Cone .................................................................................65
After the United States Supreme Court announced in United States v.
Booker that, henceforth, federal criminal sentences would be reviewed for “reasonableness,” it instructed that appellate courts
could review sentences for “substantive reasonableness.” However,
its observations about “substantive reasonableness” review have not
congealed into concrete parameters. As a result, a circuit conflict
exists regarding “substantive reasonableness” review, some circuits
holding that the re-weighing of sentencing factors is a legitimate
part of substantive reasonableness review, while others holding it is
not. This Article argues the re-weighing of sentencing factors should
not be a part of substantive reasonableness review. It proposes that
substantive reasonableness review should focus on the soundness of
a sentencing court’s reasoning and should, therefore, be limited to
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reviewing whether a sentence is arbitrary, or based on impermissible factors.

The Forgotten Jurisdiction
John Massaro ...........................................................................83
This article is the first exclusively devoted to analyzing nine overlooked words in Article III of the Constitution. While there has been
extensive mining of most of the three sentences in Article III that the
framers used to describe the role and jurisdiction of the federal
courts, little, if any, attention has previously been given to the
“affecting jurisdiction,” which is the second of the nine heads of
jurisdiction and the first of the two forms of Supreme Court original
jurisdiction. Examining the language and structure of Article III, the
proceedings at the constitutional convention, the ratification d ebates, and the early post-ratification legislation and court decisions,
this article concludes that the affecting jurisdiction was intended to
be a central part of Article III and to play a role significantly greater than the one it plays today. Applying this new vision of the affecting jurisdiction to today’s debates, this article draws a number of
conclusions about the ability of Congress to affect Supreme Court
original jurisdiction, the scope of the federal question jurisdiction,
and the propriety of the existing standing requirements for federal
courts.

Declaratory Judgment Before Exhausting Administrative Remedies
Under Illinois Law
Brian Neuffer & Deborah A. Ostvig .........................................143
Government agencies increasingly are pursing enforcement actions
and litigation against companies they believe have violated laws and
the agency’s regulations. News reports of multimillion-dollar
settlements with government agencies are commonplace. Companies
targeted by government agencies often feel powerless because the
agency has its own administrative review procedure for challenging
its enforcement actions, and that process is usually time consuming
and futile. However, from our nation’s founding, the judicial branch
has been the primary check on government agencies. This Article
explores how the declaratory judgment procedure in Illinois may be
used to test the validity of agency actions in the courts before
exhausting administrative remedies. This Article first describes the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the related
primary jurisdiction doctrine. It then overviews the Illinois
declaratory judgment statute and summarizes cases illustrating
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. The article concludes with
strategic practice considerations for using the declaratory judgments
to challenge improper agency actions.

COMMENTS
Eenie, Meenie, Miney, Mo: The Cost of Not Including Domestic
Violence Shelters Within the Definition of Dwelling
Arielle Denis ..........................................................................157
As the law currently stands, domestic violence shelters are not
included in the definition of a “dwelling” in Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 and, therefore, these shelters can turn away any
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protected class. This Comment argues domestic violence shelters
must be considered a “dwelling” within Title VIII before a 2010
amendment to the Illinois Human Rights Act, adding “order of
protection status” as a protected class, can be effective.

Pa-‘trolling’ the False Marking Frontier: Giving Section 292 the Proper
Makeover in Wake of the America Invents Act
Kevin Zickterman ......................................................................... 187
Prohibiting false patent marking on various products and goods is
not a new concept in intellectual property law. For the last 170
years, laws have been on the books to prevent individuals and
manufacturers from deceiving the public, inventors, and other
manufacturers into believing that an item or its design retains
certain patent rights by law. But in passing the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, a monumental piece of patent legislation on numerous
levels, sweeping changes were made to long-standing false marking
law and its concepts. This Comment takes a step back to explore the
recent explosion of false marking litigation after the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit interpreted these long-standing principles of false patent marking law prior to the passing of the America
Invents Act, which triggered a massive “false marking troll” revolution of sorts. It sorts out how this explosion of litigation came to be
and analyzes these principles in conjunction with the constitutional
provisions in which they were subsequently challenged by those
warding off the trolls. With this background in mind, this piece then
dives into the sweeping changes of false marking law that Congress
invoked in passing the America Invents Act with an edge toward
highlighting the caveats of these changes in relation to the act’s
original and historical purposes. This Comment then attempts to
provide the reader with additional fixes to current false marking law
under the America Invents Act to address the law’s shortcomings,
keeping in mind both the potential for future troll problems and the
original purposes of the act. Overall, this writing looks to provide, if
not concrete solutions to the law’s shortcomings in the false marking
context, food for thought in the false patent marking arena and the
new patent law reform paradigm.

iv

